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Abstract
There is a pressing need to interconnect physical systems such as power grid and vehicles for efficient
management and safe operations. Owing to the diverse features of physical systems, there is hardly a one-size-
fits-all networking solution for developing cyber-physical systems. Network slicing is a promising technology
that allows network operators to create multiple virtual networks on top of a shared network infrastructure.
These virtual networks can be tailored to meet the requirements of different cyber-physical systems. However,
it is challenging to design secure network slicing solutions that can efficiently create end-to-end network slices
for diverse cyber-physical systems. In this article, we discuss the challenges and security issues of network
slicing, study learning-assisted network slicing solutions, and analyze their performance under the denial-of-
service attack. We also present a design and implementation of a small-scale testbed for evaluating the network
slicing solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
An essential feature of cyber-physical systems is to connect physical devices and infrastructure such
as autonomous vehicles and micro power grid to the Internet for efficient system control, management
and monitoring [1]. Since different physical systems have diverse requirements of network resources,
there is hardly a one-size-fits-all networking solution for cyber-physical systems. It is also impractical
to deploy customized network infrastructure and protocols for each cyber-physical system. Therefore,
how to efficiently connect heterogeneous physical systems to the Internet in a cost-effective way is still
an open problem.
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2Networking slicing emerges as a promising technology for serving the specific needs of vertical
industries [2]. The network slicing technology empowers mobile network operators to create multiple
virtual networks, i.e., network slices, on top of shared physical network infrastructure [3]. The virtual
network can be customized to satisfy a variety of requirements of network performance and functionality.
For instance, a network slice can be created to support smart grid communications with ultra-low latency
and high reliability. Meanwhile, since smart grid control usually does not need to transfer a large amount
of data, the slice can be customized with low throughput.
To support compute-intensive applications such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, an
increasing number of cyber-physical systems require powerful computing infrastructure. For example,
autonomous vehicles need high computation capability to analyze the data collected from various
sensors such as LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) and cameras in a real-time fashion. Since the
in-vehicle computation often radiates heat that can dramatically increase the temperature inside the car,
it is desirable to offload the compute-intensive tasks to edge computing infrastructure [4], [5]. Hence,
connecting modern physical systems usually needs resources from multiple technical domains such as
radio access networks and computing servers.
The main difficulty in network slicing lies in how to utilize the physical network and computing
infrastructure efficiently and provide reliable and secure connection and computation to cyber-physical
systems. Many conceptual network slicing frameworks have been proposed by researchers from both
academia and industry [2], [3], [6]–[8]. However, only a few papers provide the in-depth discussion of
network slicing algorithms [9]–[11] and present realizable system designs [12], [13]. Although these
papers provide useful insights on network slicing and lay foundations for prototyping network slicing
solutions, they solely focus on slicing radio access networks and do not consider the performance of
a network slice which requires multiple resources, e.g., radio and computation resources. Moreover,
none of these papers designs network slicing algorithms and systems with consideration of multiple
radio access points and edge servers. In addition, existing works fail to evaluate the reliability and
vulnerability of network slicing solutions.
In this article, we discuss the challenges of end-to-end network slicing that involves multi-domain
resource orchestration for heterogeneous cyber-physical systems. Then, we study learning-assisted net-
work slicing solutions [14], [15] and analyze their performance under the denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Finally, we present the software and hardware required for developing the network slicing testbed.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the challenges of end-to-end
network slicing for cyber-physical systems. Section III presents learning-assisted end-to-end network
slicing solutions. Section IV evaluates the performance of the solution under the DoS attack through
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Figure 1. End-to-end network slicing for cyber-physical systems.
simulations. Section V shows the design and implementation of the proposed solution on a small scale
testbed. Section VI discusses the future research directions and concludes the article.
II. CHALLENGES OF END-TO-END NETWORK SLICING
In this section, we discuss the challenges of end-to-end network slices for cyber-physical systems.
Fig. 1 provides an example of network slicing for three cyber-physical systems: smart grid, connected
cars, and networked drones. Here, there are two parties: service providers and network operators. The
service provider aims to create network slices to connect its physical systems, and the network operator
owns and manages its network infrastructure. The service provider requests the network operator to
create network slices and will, once instantiated, manage them. Given the requests from multiple service
providers, the network operator instantiates network slices to meet the diverse requirements of service
providers while optimizing the utilization of the network infrastructure.
A. Heterogeneous resource demand v.s. slice performance
Modern cyber-physical systems require a variety of cyber resources from multiple technical domains.
For example, autonomous cars need communication and computation resources to transfer and analyze
sensor data, respectively. The fundamental research challenge of slicing network resources for cyber-
physical systems is from the difficulty in determining how the resource allocation in each technical
4domain impacts the performance of a network slice. Some cyber-physical systems, e.g., smart grid,
require ultra-reliable and low-latency transmission but few computation resources. Some cyber-physical
systems such as connected cars and networked drones need both low-latency communication connections
and high-performance computation resources. Since cyber-physical systems have diverse requirements
on different resources, the network operator is unable to develop a slice performance model that correctly
characterizes the slice performance versus the resource allocation in different technical domains. As a
result, it is challenging to orchestrate multi-domain resources to build a network slice for a cyber-physical
system.
Cyber-physical systems are usually deployed over a large area, and require a collection of commu-
nication and computation infrastructure that can cover the area. That is to say, a network slice consists
of many radio access points and edge servers. When creating a network slice, the network operator
needs to consider the spatial diversity of the traffic loads generated from cyber-physical systems and
allocate the resource properly among radio access points and edge servers to ensure the performance
of cyber-physical systems and support seamless mobility. Unfortunately, the fact that the traffic and
workloads of cyber-physical systems are time-variant further complicates the network slicing problem.
B. Isolation v.s. utilization
In general, there are two objectives in network slicing. The first one is to optimize the utilization
of network and computation infrastructure in order to maximize the profit of network operators. The
second one is to enforce the performance and functional isolation among network slices in order to
ensure the performance of network slices. The performance isolation guarantees that the performance
of a network slice will not affect or be affected by other network slices created on the same network
and computation infrastructure, and the functional isolation allows service providers to customize their
network slices and control their network operations independently [13].
There is, however, a conflict between isolation and resource efficiency. In wireless communications, it
is important to leverage diversity gains such as frequency diversity and multi-user diversity to improve the
efficiency of radio resources and mitigate dynamic channel fading. Exploring the diversity gain requires
pooling the resources together. The diversity gain fades away as the resources are sliced into pieces
for isolation. Therefore, functional and performance isolation may reduce the efficiency of utilizing the
resources.
The functional isolation provides the service providers, i.e., cyber-physical systems, the flexibility in
managing their virtual network and computation resources. As a result, service providers can customize
their slice operations such as traffic load balancing and user scheduling. The customized slice manage-
5ment strategies change the demands of communication and computation resources across networking
and computing infrastructure. With the functional isolation, optimizing the network slicing requires
the network operator to learn the customized management strategies and traffic profiles of individual
network slices. Sharing the information about the management strategies and traffic profiles with network
operators will incur excessive communication overhead and is not practical.
C. Virtualization v.s. security
Network slicing may introduce new vulnerabilities to cyber-physical systems. Network slicing enables
network operators to manage networking and computing infrastructure, and service providers to control
the operations of individual network slices. When creating a network slice, network operators allocate
resources from multiple technical domains to serve a cyber-physical system. These resources are virtual
and instantiated on physical networking and computing infrastructure. The service providers, i.e., cyber-
physical systems, manage the virtual resources to maximize their utilities.
When an attacker launches an attack, e.g., denial-of-service (DoS), toward the network infrastructure,
it is very difficult for network operators to detect the attack because they do not know how the
service provider utilizes the resources and whether the traffic loads are legitimate or not. The service
providers are also unable to detect the attack because they only manage the virtual resources and have
no information about the mapping from virtual to physical resources. When the attack happens, the
performance of affected network slices degrades. However, the service provider may recognize the
attack as a change of mapping from virtual to physical resources, i.e., the inflation of virtual resources.
As a result, service providers may request more virtual resources from the network operators. The
network operators may treat such requests as the traffic load increases in network slices rather than
recognizing them as abnormal behaviors of the network slice.
III. LEARNING-ASSISTED SECURE NETWORK SLICING
The security vulnerability of network slicing for cyber-physical systems is due to the lack of infor-
mation sharing between the network operator and service provider. However, sharing the information,
e.g., resource management strategies and traffic load profiles, is not practical because of the excessive
communication and computation overhead. In this section, we discuss learning-assisted network slicing
methods that allow the network operator to learn the performance of a network slice under given resource
allocation. The learning results help the network operator to understand how the service providers, i.e.,
cyber-physical systems, utilize the communication and computation resources and what the utilities of
the network slice are. The network operator may leverage such learning results to detect malicious
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Figure 2. The illustration of network slicing procedures for (a) a single network node [14] and (b) multiple network nodes [15].
attacks toward its network infrastructure and adjust its resource orchestration solutions to mitigate the
impact of the attack on the performance of network slices. We first study the network slicing solution
with consideration of a single network node and then extend the solution to create network slices over
multiple network nodes. Here, we assume that a network node is composed of both networking and
computation resources.
A. Network slicing on a single network node
The network slicing solution for a single network node is to efficiently utilize the networking
and computation resources while ensuring the performance and functional isolation among network
slices [14]. As shown in Fig. 2 (a), the network slicing solution consists of two main components:
learning assisted resource orchestrator and resource hypervisor.
Learning-assisted resource orchestrator: the resource orchestrator is responsible to orchestrate
the resource allocation in multiple technical domains to support services in network slices. Owing to
the diverse resource demands of cyber-physical systems, the resource orchestrator is unable to model
the relationship between the slice performance and multi-domain resource allocation. Therefore, the
orchestrator adopts a probabilistic model to represent the slice performance function, fi(xi), of the ith
slice under different resource allocation, xi, and exploits the model to learn the properties of the function.
Based on the learning results, the orchestrator estimates the gradient of the performance function for
each slice and optimizes the resource allocation among the slices by using the proximal gradient method.
Resource hypervisor: the function of the resource hypervisor is to map the virtual resources to
communication and computation resources in the network node. In the virtual-to-physical resource
7mapping, the resource hypervisor knows the channel state information of the users scheduled on the
virtual resources. Therefore, the hypervisor can exploit the diversity gains in wireless communications
to improve the efficiency of the radio resources.
Network slicing procedure: Fig. 2 (a) illustrates the network slicing procedure on a single network
node. The service providers send slice requests to the network operator to create network slices. Based on
the available resources and service level agreement, the network operator admits selected slice requests.
Then, the learning-assisted resource orchestrator allocates multi-domain resources to network slices
to support their services. The resources allocated to network slices are virtual resources. The service
providers can customize their resource management strategies and schedule traffic loads on the virtual
resources. Afterward, the resource hypervisor maps the virtual resources to networking and computing
infrastructure.
Security analysis: the learning-assisted resource orchestrator is able to detect a DoS attack by tracking
the properties of the slice performance function. When a network slice experiences the DoS attack, given
the same resource allocation, the performance of the slice will be degraded. By learning the properties of
the slice performance function, the resource orchestrator will observe dramatic changes in the efficiency
of the resource utilization in the slice, and thus detect the DoS attack. Then, the resource orchestrator
will reduce the resource allocation to the slice and thus mitigate the impact of the attack.
B. Network slicing over multiple network nodes
With consideration of multiple network nodes, the network operator needs to properly allocate
resources to each network node to meet the coverage requirements of cyber-physical systems and support
mobility. To this end, we design a new network slicing solution which integrates the alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM) method, a learning-assisted optimization algorithm and the multi-domain
resource hypervisor [15]. In the solution, the network slicing problem is decomposed into subproblems
that can be solved by individual network nodes based on the ADMM method. Since the total amount of
resources can be allocated to a network slice is determined by the service level agreement, a multi-node
resource coordinator is designed to coordinate resource orchestration among network nodes and enforce
the service level agreement.
Multi-node resource coordinator: the coordinator controls the multi-domain resource orchestration
in network nodes and enforces network slices to be served based on their service level agreement with
the network operator. As shown in Fig. 2 (b), the multi-node resource coordinator learns the performance
of network slices on each network node via the resource allocation report, X , and controls the resource
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Figure 3. The simulation results: (a) the performance versus time, and (b) the performance versus the number of attacked
nodes.
orchestration by adapting the auxiliary variables, Z , and the variables, U . On each network node, the
learning-assisted resource orchestrator incorporates Z and U in allocating resources to network slices.
Security analysis: the multi-node resource coordinator helps mitigate the impact of malicious attacks
toward a network node by controlling the resource allocation to the node. For example, if a network
experiences the DoS attack, the auxiliary variables, Z , and the variables, U , reported by the learning-
assisted resource orchestrator will be changed. In general, such a change informs the multi-node resource
coordinator that allocating resources to the network does not improve the performance of the network
slices. As a result, the multi-node resource coordinator will reduce the resource allocation to the network
node and re-balance the resource distribution among other network nodes that can meet the requirements
of the network slices. Eventually, no network slice subjected to the DoS attack will be hosted on the
network node.
IV. SLICE PERFORMANCE UNDER DOS ATTACK
In this section, we perform network simulations to evaluate the performance of the learning-assisted
network slicing solution under the DoS attack. In the simulation, there are 5 network nodes, and each
node consists of 5 users. For supporting cyber-physical systems, a network slice is composed of three
types of resources: uplink and downlink radio, and computation resources. The total amount of each
resource is 100 units. We assume that the utility function of the ith slice in the jth network node is
ri,j =
∑
k∈K αk · (xi,j,k) where xi,j,k is the kth resource of the ith slice in the jth network node. αk
is the weight for the kth resource and generated according to a uniform distribution ranging from 1 to
10. We compare the performance of the learning-assisted algorithm with a baseline algorithm which
allocates all resources evenly among all the network slices and distributes the resources of a network
slice evenly to all network nodes.
9Fig. 3 (a) shows the performance of the learning-assisted algorithm under the DoS attack. The
attack is launched toward one node at the 20th time slot. In the beginning, the learning-assisted
algorithm appropriates the same resource allocation as the baseline algorithm does. Then, the learning-
assisted algorithm gradually learns the slice performance functions and improves the overall utilities by
optimizing the resource allocation among nodes and slices. The learning-assisted algorithm converges
after the 6th time slot time and obtains 1.17x performance improvement as compared to the baseline
algorithm. Once the attack on a node occurs, the performance of network slices significantly decreases
under both the learning-assisted algorithm and baseline algorithm. The algorithm is able to learn the
changes of the resource utilization efficiency on each node with respect to the slice performance. The
learned results help to detect the attack on nodes and further adjust the resource allocation among nodes.
For example, the algorithm allocates more resources toward the nodes with higher resource utilization
efficiency and decrease the resource provision of nodes with lower resource utilization efficiency. In
this way, the malicious attack on the node can be excluded from the network. Since the resources are
favorably allocated to high efficiency nodes, the learning-assisted algorithm mitigates the impact of the
DoS attack and restores nearly 98% of the performance of the network slices. In addition, under the
DOS attack, the slice performance with the learning-assisted algorithm is 1.45x better than that with
the baseline algorithm.
Fig. 3 (b) shows the performance of the network slices when the number of network nodes instigated
by the DoS attack increases. The total number of network nodes in the simulation is 10. Without attacks,
i.e., the learning-assisted algorithm obtains 1.39x better performance than the baseline algorithm. When
the number of the network nodes experiencing the DoS attack increases, the performance of the network
slices decreases under both algorithms. However, the learning-assisted algorithm is able to minimize
the impact of the attack on the performance of the network slices. For example, when 8 network nodes
are attacked, the learning-assisted algorithm can identify the under-attack nodes and adjust the resource
allocation among nodes to exclude the malicious attacks in the network. As a result, the slice performance
obtained by the learning-assisted algorithm is 4.63x better than that with the baseline algorithm.
These simulation results validate the learning-assisted network slicing solution to be able to mitigate
the impact of the DoS attack on the performance of the network slices. In other words, the learning-
assisted network slicing solution can create network slices that are reliable and secure for cyber-physical
systems.
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V. SYSTEM PROTOTYPING AND RESULTS
In this section, we present the design of a small-scale prototype for evaluating the end-to-end network
slicing solutions.
A. Prototype Design
System Hardware: in the prototype, we consider the radio communication network and GPU comput-
ing platform as the main components. As shown in Fig. 4, the prototype consists of two network nodes,
and each node has both radio and computing resources. The radio access network and core network
are implemented based on the OpenAirInterface (OAI) LTE platform and openair-cn1, respectively.
We deploy two eNodeBs in different places to emulate a cellular network with limited co-channel
interference. The computing platform is built based on NVIDIA CUDA-enable GPU2. We use a computer
with two NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti as the computing platform. Ettus USRP B210 SDR is adopted as the
RF front-end of an eNodeB, and LTE dongles are used to emulate mobile users.
Radio Resource Hypervisor: the radio resource hypervisor maps the virtual radio resources to
physical radio resources in LTE networks, i.e., physical resource blocks (PRBs) of PUSCH/PDSCH.
Here, we define the virtual resource as radio bandwidth that can be flexibly allocated to users by network
slices, e.g., 360kHz. We let network slices on a node share the same control plane following the LTE
standards, and focus on allocating the uplink/downlink PRB resources in the user plane. As illustrated
in Fig. 4 (b), the radio resource hypervisor maps users’ virtual radio resources to PRBs. Since the user
information, i.e., channel condition and virtual resources, is known during the mapping, we leverage
1OpenAirInferace is an open-source platform and implementation of 3GPP cellular networks. Available online: https:gitlab.eurecom.fr/oai
2CUDA is a GPU parallel computing architecture developed by NVIDIA.
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Figure 5. The performance of network slicing solutions under the DoS attack.
the information to maximize the network throughput. In particular, we greedily select the user with the
best channel condition for each PRB.
Computing Resource Hypervisor: the computing resource hypervisor maps virtual computing re-
sources to the GPU computing resources. In the prototype, we use the CUDA programming model, in
which an application can invoke multiple kernels, and executing each kernel requires a number of CUDA
threads. To manage the computing resource, we develop a token-based kernel scheduler to control the
execution of kernels. Here, the number of tokens reflect the amount of virtual computing resources.
That is, a user with more tokens is able to use more computing resources. As illustrated in Fig. 4 (c),
the kernel scheduler dispatches the kernels according to the available tokens of users. We develop a
KernelSpawn function to manage users’ kernels as a FIFO queue. Once a user has sufficient tokens, the
user’s kernel is pulled out of the queue and executed.
B. Experimental Results
With the system prototype, we evaluate the performance of the learning-assisted algorithm under the
DoS attack. In the experiment, we create three network slices over two network nodes to serve six
mobile users. Each network node hosts three network slices, and one user is associated with a network
slice on a network node. In the experiment, the DoS attack is launched toward network slice 1 and 3
on network nodes 2 and 1, respectively. (see Fig. 4.)
Fig. 5 shows resource allocated to network slices on different nodes with the baseline and learning-
assisted algorithms. Fig. 5 (a) shows that all resources of network slices 1 and 3 are allocated by the
learning-assisted algorithm to network nodes 1 and 2, respectively. This result verifies that the learning-
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based algorithm can identify the under-attack node by deriving from the resource utilization efficiency.
With the learned results, the learning-based algorithm allocates resources to the high efficiency nodes
to obtain higher performance. As a result, the performance of the network slices will not be degraded
significantly. This result verifies that the learning-assisted algorithm can mitigate the impact of the DoS
attack by controlling the resource allocation. On the other hand, the baseline algorithm is unable to
adjust the resource allocation under the DoS attack as shown in Fig. 5 (b).
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we have discussed the needs and challenges of supporting cyber-physical systems
with virtual network slices. By providing network slices with functional and performance isolation
to various vertical services, the attack on a single slice may not affect the performance of others.
The desired virtualization techniques should be capable to isolate the effect of attacks on the virtual
resource layer without affecting the physical infrastructures. Besides, we have identified the security
vulnerability of network slicing caused by the multi-domain resource virtualization. Given the numerous
attack types, e.g., DoS and man-in-the-middle, and the complicated influence on cyber-physical systems,
e.g., performance degradation, intelligent solutions for identifying attacks, isolating attacks influence,
and excluding attacks from the network are highly desired. Since machine learning (ML) techniques
have been successfully applied in various areas such as computer vision and robot control, utilizing
emerging ML and developing learning based algorithms is promising to tackle various attacks on cyber-
physical systems. To address the security issue, we have presented the learning-assisted network slicing
solution and analyzed the performance of the network slices under the denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
The simulation results show that the learning-assisted network slicing solution is able to mitigate the
impact of the DoS attack on the network slices. We have also presented the development of a small-scale
testbed for evaluating network slicing solutions for cyber-physical systems.
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